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PERILS OF PLURALISM 
Kelly James Clark 
Two pressures toward religious pluralism are the variety of religious tradi-
tions which seem equally successful in the transformation of human lives 
and that apparently sincere and equally capable truth-seekers reach diver-
gent conclusions about the nature of ultimate reality. I discuss Hick's 
Kantian explanation of these phenomena. I argue that his account is: nei-
ther the only nor the best account; furthermore that more reasonable 
accounts allow for the members of competing traditions to affirm the truth 
of their religious beliefs; and if Hick's explanation were accepted it would 
undermine the salvific power of the respective religious traditions. 
I 
John Hick claims that there is a variety of religious traditions each of 
which, so far as we can tell, is equally successful in the transformation of 
human lives. Although they differ in their characterizations both of the 
goal of human life and of the processes necessary for the attainment of 
such goals, each of the disparate processes seems nonetheless well-suited 
for the goal of the transformation of human lives from self-centeredness 
to what he terms Reality-centeredness. Salvation/liberation/fulfill-
ment/ enlightenment are among the many and most prominent names of 
this goal; for shorthand, I shall use the term "transformation" for salva-
tion/liberation/ fulfillment/ enlightenment throughout the paper. Each 
religion offers its own, unique path to transformation. Pragmatically 
speaking, according to Hick, claims to exclusive access to religious truth 
for the various religions seem unfounded or even irrelevant. 
Religious diversity recognizes that apparently sincere and equally 
cognitively capable truth-seekers reach widely divergent conclusions 
about the nature of ultimate reality. The pressures of diversity are clear: 
to maintain that's one's own religious beliefs are true and, therefore, that 
all religious competitors are false smacks of arrogance and intolerance. 
Religious exclusivism also seems to make transformation a matter of 
luck - that is, if traditional Christianity, for example, is true then it is 
just a matter of luck that you happen to have been born to a conserva-
tive, Christian family in the heart of America; if you had been born in 
India, say, you more than likely would have been a Hindu. Momentous 
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options, such as one's eternal destiny, ought not hang on the thin thread 
of chance. 
If only one transformational system is true and outside of that trans-
formational system none is saved, more people will be spiritually lost 
than not (assuming, as many religions claim, that most people have not 
availed themselves of the appropriate transformational system); this is a 
clearly undesirable state of affairs; the damnation of the vast majority of 
the peoples of the world and throughout history is indeed lamentable. If 
an explanation of religious diversity is forthcoming which is both likely 
to be truE' and is transformationally generous and inclusive, then it 
ought to be wholeheartedly embraced. 
In this essay I shall discuss Hick's rather Kantian explanation of these 
phenomena. I shall argue that such an account of religious diversity is: 
(a) neither the only nor the best account. In addition I will argue that (b) 
a better account allows for the members of competing traditions to 
affirm the exclusive truth of their religious beliefs, and (c) if Hick's 
Kantian explanation were accepted it would undermine the transforma-
tional power of the respective religious traditions. 
Before turning to criticisms of Hick's position, let us outline his 
Kantian explanation of religious diversity. Hick's understanding of reli-
gious diversity is called religious pluralism which he contrasts with 
exclusivism and inclusivism. Exclusivism is that view that transforma-
tion is restricted to a single group and that everyone outside of that 
group is excluded from transformation. Tnclusivism is the view that 
while a single group may hold the correct view concerning the means of 
transformation (say that it is through the death of Jesus on the cross), the 
benefits of transformation are nonetheless available to those outside of 
that group (people can be washed in the blood of Jesus, even if they 
aren't aware of it); universalism is consistent with inclusivism. 
Religious pluralism is thoroughly universalistic and affirms a plurality 
of transformational responses to the ultimate divine reality; each of the 
religious traditions is transformationally efficacious; none of the reli-
gious traditions is in a transformationally privileged position. 
A universal affirmation of the various major religious traditions is the 
transcendence of divine Reality.' Transcendence, according to Hick, is 
the view that the divine Reality "cannot be encompassed in human 
terms."2 He distinguishes lithe Real an sich (in him/her/itself) and the 
Real as humanly experienced and thought."3 This divine Reality is one 
yet capable of being experienced in a multitude of ways." The variety of 
religious traditions is formed out of this awareness of the divine: "Our 
hypothesis is that they are formed by the presence of the divine Reality, 
this presence coming to consciousness in terms of the different sets of 
religious concepts and structures of religious meaning that operate with-
in the different religious traditions of the world.'" Hick endorses an 
explicitly Kantian understanding of the distinction between the Real an 
sich and the real as humanly experienced." The Kantian distinction 
between phenomena and noumena is apparent. We can have access to 
the phenomenal world of religious experience, of appearances as catego-
rized by human cognitive powers, but not to the divine noumenal 
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world. What we do not, indeed cannot, encounter in these experiences 
is Reality in itself. 
The great virtue of Hick's metaphysics is that it makes most every 
religious tradition, in a sense, true. We can be wrong about reality 
claims, but how could we be wrong about how things appear to us? So 
God or the Absolute or the Whatever appears to some as personal, to 
others as impersonal and to others as non-existent. And each is right, 
insofar as their understanding of their beliefs does not extend beyond 
the terms of appearances. God appears to me, for example, to be per-
sonal (given my contingent location within a particular historico-cultur-
al tradition). Religious assertions, properly translated into appearance 
language, are all true. 
But this conceptual gain is bought with a price-no religious asser-
tions, as claims about reality, are true. Indeed, they are either unjusti-
fied, false or meaningless insofar as they ascribe properties to God an 
sich. God may appear to us as loving, kind, patient, just, jealous, rock, 
snake or non-existent. But what God is an sich is utter mystery. We can-
not, due to our cognitive limitations, peer behind the veil of appearances 
to Reality. What God is really like is something we know not what. As 
Hick writes: 
... we cannot apply to the Real an sich the characteristics encoun-
tered in its personae and impersonae. Thus it cannot be said to be 
one or many, person or thing, substance or process, good or evil, 
purposive or non-purposive. None of the concrete descriptions 
that apply within the realm of human experience can apply liter-
ally to the unexperienceable ground of that realm. For whereas 
the phenomenal world is structured by our own conceptual 
frameworks, its noumenal ground is not. We cannot even speak 
of this as a thing or an entity ... the noumenal Real is such as to be 
authentically experienced as a range of both theistic and nonthe-
istic phenomena. On this basis we cannot, as we have seen, say 
that the Real an sich has the characteristics displayed by its man-
ifestations, such as (in the case of the heavenly Father) love and 
justice or (in the case of Brahman) consciousness and bliss. But 
it is nevertheless the noumenal ground of these characteristics.7 
Although none of our beliefs about God an sich is or can be known to 
be true, Hick nonetheless affirms such beliefs as genuine manifestations 
of the divine and as reliable guides for transformation from self-cen-
teredness to Reality-centeredness. 
II 
There are at least four possible explanations of the widespread reli-
gious disagreement of apparently sincere truth-seekers. Let me list them 
with a brief description of each: 
HI. The Kantian Explanation. God as he is in himself cannot be 
known. We can only know God as he appears to us. No humanly avail-
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able concepts apply to God.s 
H2. The Cultural Filter Explanation. God presents himself to people 
as he is in himself but the effects of one's socio-cultural background 
cause him to be understood in radically different ways. Although all 
beliefs are "laden" with one's cultural categories or gestalt9, some are 
closer to the truth than others. That is, some cultural filters enable rather 
than distort perception of the truth. 
H3. The Perversity Explanation. There is a determinate way that God 
is experienced but human wickedness perverts beliefs about God. 
According to this view, God as experienced is both terrifying and invit-
ing. Rather than give up belief in God, he is tamed by our wills to make 
him more manageable. lO The defect, according to this view, is not noetic 
or metaphysical, because everyone has roughly the same cognitive equip-
ment and the same informational input; it is, rather, volitional. The 
Perversity Explanation affirms that religious competitors are only appar-
ently sincere truth-seekers; they are not so in reality-those who hold 
incorrect views are involved in willful or self-deceptive insincerity. 
H.. The Epistemically Privileged Explanation. There is a determi-
nate way that God reveals himself to all people, say through experience, 
nature or morality, but some people have been graciously given more 
information about God than others. According to this view everyone 
has some access to significant knowledge of God. Nonetheless, either 
through revelation or more frequent and detailed experiences, some 
people simply have access to more of the divine truth. The remainder 
are not epistemologically destitute but they have been left more to their 
own devices in the development of their religious traditions; they have 
needed to fill in the theological gaps, so to speak, but in an informational 
void. The additional theological commitments are mere human accre-
tions that are, therefore, more liable to misunderstanding and error. 
Which of these is the best explanation of religious diversity? We may 
prefer the Kantian Explanation because it makes all religious beliefs, at 
least as appearance beliefs, true; but we have noted the costs of such a 
belief: all religious beliefs as reality claims are either unjustified, false or 
meaningless. I I There is the further possibility that behind the veil of 
appearance lies nothing or no one interested in transformation. 
According to this view everyone can be transformed; or can they? 
Skepticism about God an sich makes optimism about the generous 
opportunitiles for transformation equally dubious. This view is long on 
promise but its fulfillment is uncertain. Religious belief maintains an 
interest in one's ultimate destiny but also that reality undergirds the 
possible attainment of a favorable outcome. So, to take Christianity as 
an example, salvation is the goal (peace with God, self, other humans 
and the world) and the means of attainment are the atonement of Jesus 
and the work of the Holy Spirit. If ultimate Reality is indifferent both to 
these ends and to these means, then what remains of one's Christian 
beliefs? Hick's Kantian view offers no assurance that divine reality is at 
all concerned about either means or ends. 
The Cultural Filter Explanation holds out the possibility of attaining 
objective truth about God. Yet we are all trapped within the filters of 
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our socio-historical tradition. There is no filter-independent means, so 
to speak, for determining if our cognitive lens is filtering out distortions 
and focusing on the truth. We cannot get what Nagel calls lithe view 
from nowhere" to observe both our beliefs and the reality they attempt 
to grasp. One might argue that we can check our beliefs to determine if 
they are tracking reality in ways analogous to science which is itself a 
human project likewise situated within the flow of human history. 
Science appeals to factors like predictive success, fertility, explanatory 
power, simplicity and the like which are intended to reduce the distort-
ing effects of our socio-historical filters and provide some assurance that 
we are progressing towards the truth. Some are dubious that such prag-
matic criteria do the work that scientific realists contend and argue that 
in the end pronouncements of progressive verisimilitude are no more 
than professions of faith. 12 Nonetheless, pragmatic criteria simply won't 
do as a means for separating the religious chaff from the wheat. For pre-
sumably such criteria will be moral or spiritual and most major religions 
claim success at transformation. From within one's own culture, one's 
own tradition will appear superior. We may be able to rule out the odd 
cult or the occasional demonic religion, but we won't have progressed 
much towards eliminating any of the various major world religions as 
contenders for the truth. The Cultural Filters Explanation holds out the 
possibility of attaining truth about God, but makes it difficult to deter-
mine if anyone has actually grasped it. In order to distinguish the 
Cultural Filters Explanation from the Epistemically Privileged 
Explanation, I will stipulate that one's cultural filters are not divinely 
implanted or epistemically justified.13 
Although the Perversity Explanation has a rich history, it has been 
afforded little credence of late. The Apostle Paul in the first book of 
Romans, for example, argues that everyone has been granted knowledge 
of God but, through human wickedness, has exchanged that truth for a 
lie; we have suppressed the truth, he says, in unrighteousness. The 
Augustinian tradition has followed st. Paul on these matters and attrib-
utes unbelief to concupiscence. According to this view, false belief 
about God is willful (although not necessarily conscious) and is thereby 
morally culpable ignorance. I don't think Christianity alone is liable to 
this view; I have little doubt that were I a student of world religions I 
would discover, amongst the Holy writ of the various religions, perver-
sity explanations of their religious competitors. The Perversity 
Explanation has fallen on hard times because of the pressures of toler-
ance and abhorrence of arrogance - many people eschew impugning 
the motives of one who from all appearances is an equally sincere truth-
seeker. Even more so, such persons do not wish to impugn an entire tra-
dition of apparently sincere and evidently pious religious believers. 
The Epistemically Privileged Explanation allows both for some, albeit 
limited, access to the truth on the part of everyone and some, more priv-
ileged and extensive, access to the truth on the part of others (typically a 
minority); some people are simply in a better epistemic situation with 
respect to the divine Reality. But which are in this better cognitive posi-
tion? Each of the major religions, of course, will claim that it is. If epis-
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temic privilege has been granted to a single tradition, however, all of the 
other traditions will be wrong, at least on areas of disagreement to 
which the privileged few alone have been granted epistemic access. 
Again, which of those is in a better epistemic position with respect to 
God? From all appearances it is hard to tell. One might expect that the 
people within the tradition which has privileged access would be more 
transformationally successful. They, after all, have more truth and 
should have more means at their disposal of availing themselves of the 
truth in a transformationally advantageous manner. But, again, given 
the apparent success of the major religions in effecting at least significant 
moral improvement, it is difficult to appeal to transformational superior-
ity in determining epistemic privilege. 
One might contend that granting special access to the truth to some 
and not to others is gratuitous on the part of God and one would be 
right. This seems to make transformation more a matter of luck (aka 
providence) than seems appropriate for a loving God (which assump-
tion cannot be affirmed on the Kantian view). It is probably no accident 
that certain forms of Christianity, say, have endorsed both the privileged 
epistemic access explanation and a strong view of predestination. These 
two views are not necessarily concomitant however. God may have 
granted special epistemic access to a certain group of people not simply 
to save them and to damn the remainder (who have, according to some 
views, insufficient knowledge for transformation but sufficient knowl-
edge to be damned) but to make them responsible for the dissemination 
of such truths to the remainder. The privilege of extra divine informa-
tion carries with it more peril-of failing in the corresponding obligation 
to share that knowledge. Or perhaps, given human weakness of will, 
any additional information about God simply increases one's opportuni-
ty for damnation. The increased knowledge of God may carry with it a 
burden which few can bear. Perhaps, therefore, it is more transforma-
tionally beneficial to have been granted only a bit of the divine by which 
to be judged than the whole lot given to the privileged who are doomed 
to failure. At any rate the Epistemically Privileged Explanation of the 
plurality of religions smacks of arbitrariness on the part of God and, 
given that transformational systems of competing religions are roughly 
equal in moral transformation, does not assist in determining which reli-
gion is true. 
The moral of this section is clear: the diversity of religious beliefs, 
taken alone, underdetermines which of the above explanations is true. 
Each of these explanations adequately explains some forms of religious 
diversity and each has significant religious costs and benefits. Hick's 
Kantian explanation is successful in explaining the data but no more 
successful than any of the competing explanations. Unless one is com-
mitted a priori to a Kantian metaphysics/epistemology, and Hick has not 
argued on a priori grounds, the Kantian view has no explanatory advan-
tage over its competitors. It is not arguably the best explanation and as I 
shall show in the next section it is arguably not the best explanation. 
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III 
In the previous section I outlined four possible explanations of reli-
gious diversity. I can see no reason for not supposing that they are all 
roughly equally successful in explaining religious diversity and that 
none is any more successful at explaining the data than any other. 
Furthermore I can see no a priori reason for accepting one of the 
hypotheses over the others; that is, on logical or metaphysical grounds 
none of the explanations is to be preferred. Which explanation ought 
one accept? For reflective religious believers this is a matter of some 
urgency. At least one of the explanations, Hick's, contends that no reli-
gious beliefs are indicative of the divine reality; others, as exemplified in 
many of the world's great religions, exclude the vast majority from 
transformation. In this section I shall argue that it is reasonable for a 
religious believer to affirm one of the more realist explanations of reli-
gious diversity and that it is unreasonable for them to accept Hick's 
Kantian Explanation. 
Hick's Kantian account of the varieties of equally transformational 
religious traditions is motivated in large part by his commitment to reli-
gious pluralism and not vice versa. Pressures of religious diversity 
drive the Kantian explanation; the Kantian explanation does not drive 
his views of religious diversity. He writes: liThe hypothesis of an ulti-
mate divine noumenon is arrived at inductively. We start from the phe-
nomenological data of the forms of religious experience and thought 
presented by the history of religion. We then seek to interpret these data 
from the standpoint of the basic conviction that religious experience is 
not, as such and in toto, a realm of illusory projection but is also, at least 
in part, an effect within human consciousness of the presence and pres-
sure of a transcendent divine Reality."14 Hick's metaphysical underpin-
ning of religious pluralism has the alleged advantages of preserving the 
integrity of the great religious traditions and of allowing for the transfor-
mation of everyone regardless of their religious allegiances. I shall 
demonstrate, however, that Hick's claim to have arrived at his conclu-
sion inductively is simply unsupported by argument. 
How might such an inductive argument proceed? A well known the-
orem of the probability calculus is Bayes' theorem. Bayes' theorem is 
commonly used in confirmation theory and has been applied recently to 
the rational justification of beliefs. Bayes' theorem is stated as follows 
(where h is the hypothesis in question, g is the relevant evidence, and k 
is general background knowledge): 
P(h/ e&k) = P(e/h&k) x P(h/k) 
P(e/k) 
For the purposes of this discussion let us take h to stand for one of the 
competing explanations of religious diversity, HI-H.. I will discuss 
shortly how we should understand k. 
How should we understand the evidence of religious diversity, g? g 
can be taken in a variety of ways with varying strength and weakness. 
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The weakest sense of religious diversity simply recognizes the obvious 
truth of widespread religious diversity: 
The Weak Religious Diversity Claim (WRD): (a) Apparently 
sincere and equally cognitively capable truth-seekers reach 
widely divergent ("incompatible") conclusions about the nature 
of ultimate realityY 
The moderate sense makes claims about the apparent sincerity, intellec-
tual acuity and moral progress of practioners of various religions: 
The Moderate Religious Diversity Claim (MRD): (a) 
Apparently sincere and equally cognitively capable truth-seek-
ers reach widely divergent ("incompatible") conclusions about 
the nature of ultimate reality. (b) The religious convictions of 
the major religions inspire their adherents to significant moral 
transformation. 
The strong sense makes similar judgments to MRD but adds that the 
various religious traditions are roughly equal in transformational effec-
tiveness: 
The Strong Religious Diversity Claim (SRD): (a) Apparently sin-
cere and equally cognitively capable truth-seekers reach widely 
divergent ("incompatible") conclusions about the nature of ulti-
mate reality. (b) There is a variety of religious traditions which 
are equally successful in the significant moral transformation of 
human lives. (c) There is a variety of religious traditions which, 
so far as we can tell, are equally successful in the spiritual trans-
formation of human lives. 
Hick, of course, takes SRD as evidence. 
How one acquires the evidence is also a factor in whether or not one 
adjudges the evidence to be WRD, MRD or SRD. WRD is indisputable 
and can be acquired by a variety of means - anecdote, reading one's 
holy writ, through a textbook, watching the news. MRD and SRD 
require that one make assessments of the moral and intellectual character 
of participants of other religions; one must adjudge, for example, 
whether or not adherents of competing religious traditions are sincere. 
Additionally, one must make judgments about the moral and spiritual 
progress that others have made. Often one acquires MRD or SRD as new 
evidence if one meets a devout practitioner of a different religious tradi-
tion. Knowledge by acquaintance of sincere believers in competing reli-
gious beliefs often prompts reevaluation of one's own religious beliefs. 
According to Bayes' theorem the probability of a hypothesis is deter-
mined by the hypothesis's explanatory power and its prior probability. 
Let us consider these in order. 
(a) Explanatory Power. A hypothesis has explanatory power if it 
makes the evidence more likely than it would be in the absence of the 
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hypothesis. This is indicated by: 
P(e/h&k) 
P(e/k) 
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The greater the likelihood of the evidence given the hypothesis, that is 
the greater P(e/h&k), the greater the explanatory power of a hypothesis. 
Also the more unlikely the evidence is on general background knowl-
edge, the greater the explanatory power. If the hypothesis only slightly 
raises the probability of the evidence over that given on background 
knowledge alone, that is if P(e/h&k) is only slightly greater than P(e/k), 
then the explanatory power of the hypothesis is only slight. 
Let us assume, not unreasonably, that g is not likely given k. For the 
sake of this argument let us assume, again not unreasonably I believe, 
that hypotheses HI-H4 have equal explanatory power with respect to the 
Weak Religious Diversity Claim: HI-H4 explain equally well what, given 
general background knowledge, is otherwise unexplained. That is 
P(e/HI&k) = P(e/H2&k) = P(e/H3&k) = P(e/H4&k). Since they have 
equal explanatory power, none of the competing hypotheses is any more 
likely than any other given WRD. 
If we take the Moderate Diversity Claim as evidence, again HI-H4 are 
roughly equal in explanatory power. HI and H2, The Kantian and 
Cultural Filter Explanations, seem unproblematic: because it is God (or 
Ultimate Reality) that people believe themselves to be encountering or 
becoming aware of and because judgments are made by various practi-
tioners of competing religions that God (or Ultimate Reality) is moral 
and that transformation is attained by aligning themselves with or avail-
ing themselves of God (or Ultimate Reality), the motivation to be moral 
is clear. HI and H2 may lead one to expect significant moral transforma-
tion. It is not so clear if a practioner of religion were to come to believe 
HI, the Kantian Explanation, that the motivation to be moral would 
remain strong; I shall discuss this in the final section of this essay. The 
Perversity Explanation has lower explanatory power than HI or H2 given 
MRD as it attributes false religious beliefs to the moral or spiritual defect 
of the believer. While this hypothesis would lead one to expect widely 
divergent religious beliefs, one might not expect significant moral trans-
formation. But, again, one might recognize that practioners of "per-
verse" religions would still believe themselves to be relating properly to 
God or Ultimate Reality; so one might still be able to account for some 
significant moral transformation on the part of believers of traditions 
that one considers perverse. Perversity might be used to explain what 
an individual considers odd moral and spiritual beliefs, say, the rever-
ence of cows, cannibalism or widow-burning, etc. What one adjudges 
as moral deficiencies may be attributed to spiritual perversity. Similar 
concessions might be made for H4, The Epistemically Privileged 
Explanation. Adjudged moral deficiencies would be attributed to lack 
of information and moral successes to sufficient information to allow for 
significant moral transformation. Widely divergent religious beliefs 
would be attributed not to difference in the cognitive capabilities or to 
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the lack of sincerity of the various inquirers, but to an increase of infor-
mation on the part of one party of inquirers. 
If one accepts The Strong Religious Diversity Claim (SRD), the 
explanatory power of the competing hypotheses is no longer roughly 
equal. Although Hand H2 may be roughly equal in leading one to 
expect SRD, H, and H4 clearly are not. H3 and H4 would not lead one to 
expect that various religious traditions would be equally successful in 
the moral and spiritual transformation of human lives. If one were to 
attribute religious diversity to perversity or ignorance, then one would 
surely not expect competing traditions to be equally successful in the 
spiritual transformation of human lives. If one were to accept SRD, then 
one might be rationally compelled to reject H, or H4; I shall argue in the 
next section, however, that those who are antecedently committed to H3 
or H4 are not likely to accept SRD as true. 
There is another relevant factor in the determination of rationality as 
understood by the Bayesian. The hypothesis in question must not only 
explain otherwise inexplicable data, the hypothesis must also have: 
(b) Prior Probability. According to Bayes' theorem, the hypothesis in 
question must have some antecedent likelihood given our general back-
ground knowledge. This is represented by the following portion of 
Bayes' Theorem: 
P(hjk) 
What is the probability of the hypothesis in question given general back-
ground knowledge? There are many wildly implausible candidates for 
explanation of the data that are not considered worthy of rational scrutiny 
because they fail the test of prior probability. No matter how well they 
explain the data, when multiplied by the low probability assigned P(hjk), 
their consequent probability will be likewise low. This is analogous to 
William James's point that hypotheses for consideration must be living.16 
The crucial question is what is one allowed to consider as general 
background knowledge, k? If one considers only tautologies, as does 
Richard Swinburne in his famous probabilistic argument for the exis-
tence of God, then one will be no further ahead. 17 I don't see how one 
could make any reasonable assignment of probabilities to HI-H, on the 
basis of tautologies. Even if there were an objective, a priori probability 
of these hypotheses, I don't see how anyone could reasonably claim to 
know or to have a reasonable belief about what that probability is.IS If 
we are left to making judgments on the basis of mere tautological evi-
dence then we must remain agnostic about which of the competing 
hypotheses, Hi-H4, is more likely than its competitors. 
Let us, therefore, expand k to include not only tautologies but all of 
our rationally justified beliefs.19 Why exclude any relevant evidence 
from the evaluation of hypotheses? If our goal is getting at the truth, 
then why not bring all that we know or justifiably believe to bear on the 
evaluation of hypotheses? This seems to me the strategy taken, for 
example, in science where one no longer seriously considers theories 
which postulate fairies, telepathic penguins, crystalline spheres or 
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imponderable fluids. The preference for naturalistic and mechanistic 
explanations is not justifiable on a priori grounds for tautologous evi-
dence is indifferent to quarks and fairies; rather, plausibility judgments 
are made a posteriori on the basis of other propositions that one justifi-
ably believes. Let us then expand k to include all relevant background 
beliefs. Thus expanded, k will allow one to sort amongst the competing 
hypotheses, HI-H4, to determine plausible candidates for consideration. 
Suppose that one is brought up in a particular religious tradition to 
hold certain beliefs about God, or that one comes to hold certain beliefs 
about God on the basis of a putative religious experience, or that one 
makes the considered and sober judgment that the best explanation of a 
variety of factors is that God, as described by a specific religious tradi-
tion, exists. In any of these cases one's belief in God as specified will be 
prima facie justified, or so it seems to me. Relevant justifying conditions 
include accepting things on the testimony of those whom one trusts, on 
the basis of experiences, or on the basis of inference to best explanation 
of a variety of data. In the case of religious belief, one typically affirms 
that God or Ultimate Reality really is or is like the way he or it have been 
described by one tradition or another. That is, most religious believers 
are realists concerning their beliefs about God or Ultimate Reality. If 
most believers have prima facie justified beliefs about God or Ultimate 
Reality that are realist in import, then it is appropriate for such believers 
to include such beliefs in their respective ks. 
Consider once again The Weak Religious Diversity Claim (WRD). 
Suppose we are evaluating Hl, the Kantian Explanation of the Religious 
Diversity Claim. If k includes realistic beliefs about God then P(Hl/k) 
will be low. And the consequent probability of HI, given WRD, will 
likewise be low. That is, it will not be reasonable, for one in this epis-
temic situation, to affirm HI. Three options remain for the religious 
Bayesian: The Cultural Filter Explanation, H2; The Perversity 
Explanation, H3; and The Epistemologically Privileged Explanation, H •. 
Given their roughly equal explanatory power with respect to WRD, 
which of these is reasonable for one to believe given WRD will, once 
again, be determined by one's justified background beliefs. If k includes 
justified beliefs about God (realistically construed) and about the lack of 
revelation granted to some people, then one may reasonably adjudge 
that P(H./k) is high (relative to its competitors); if k includes justified 
beliefs about God (realistically construed) and attributes unbelief to 
pride, for example, one may reasonably adjudge that P(H3/k) is high 
(relative to its competitors). And considerations could likewise lead one 
to reasonably adjudge that P(H2/k) is high (relative to its competitors). 
Whichever hypothesis H2, H3 or H4 one adjudges as high given their k, 
one will also reasonably affirm as the best overall hypothesis for the 
explanation of the WRD. 
The problem for Hick's Kantian Explanation, HI, is this: if k rightly 
includes prima facie justified religious beliefs, most of which for most 
ordinary believers are realist, then it won't be rational for most believers 
to affirm that P(Hl/k) is higher than P(Hz/k), P(H3/k) or P(H4/k). 
Indeed they will affirm the opposite. And if so, it will not be reasonable, 
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given that H,-H4 explain equally well the WRD, for them to affirm HI 
given their total evidence. Given the background beliefs of most ordi-
nary believers (those that are realists about their religious beliefs), the 
only likely beliefs, and hence the only reasonable beliefs, concerning reli-
gious diversity, are H,-H4. Similar judgments will be made if we take the 
Moderate Religious Diversity Claim (MRD) as evidence. 
Finally let us consider the Strong Religious Diversity Claim (SRD).20 
HI surely explains SRD but I shall raise a problem concerning the ratio-
nal acceptability of SRD in the next section. H, might lead one to expect 
SRD as well. But given H3 and H4 one would not expect SRD. H4 attrib-
utes religious diversity to ignorance and it seems extremely unlikely that 
the ignorant would be as successful at spiritual transformation as the 
epistemically privileged. H3, The Perversity Explanation, attributes the-
ological error to conative error. If a religious group held false beliefs 
about God not merely out of ignorance but on the basis of bad will, it is 
unlikely that such beliefs would serve equally well in the transformation 
of lives as true beliefs and good will. That is, the probability of SRD is 
low on H3. If SRD is accepted, one must update one's prior commit-
ments. If SRD is taken as true, a reasonable person who antecedently 
held H3 or H4 would have to decrease her confidence in H3 and H4 and 
increase confidence in either HI or H2. 
There is, of course, a proviso that must be met by our rational believ-
ings. So far all that has been claimed is that hypotheses HI-H4 are likely 
given WRD or MRD if certain of one's religious beliefs are prima facie jus-
tified. But prima facie justification can be defeated by other beliefs that 
one entertains, holds or should hold. So if one were to come to be per-
suaded by, say, the argument from evil or by J. L. Mackie's cumulative 
argument against theism, then perhaps one ought reasonably to shift 
from HI-H4 to atheism or agnosticism. If one were persuaded of Kantian 
epistemology on independent grounds, then one ought to affirm the 
Kantian Explanation, HI. Given that defeaters are relative to noetic 
structures, people with varying beliefs will be affected by alleged 
defeaters in a variety of different ways. There is a great deal more to be 
said about defeaters which I shall pass over here.21 
The question which I would like to raise here is this: Is the wide-
spread disagreement of equally sincere truth-seekers a defeater of H2, H3 
or H4? Is the fact of religious diversity, WRD or MRD, a defeater for 
realist interpretations of religious belief? The answer, so it seems to me, 
is clearly ''No''. Equally sincere truth seekers often disagree about sig-
nificant matters of belief. Einstein disagreed with his contemporaries 
about theories of indeterminism. Amongst biologists there is disagree-
ment about whether selection is genotypic or phenotypic. Widely vari-
ant political philosophies are held by serious thinkers of every stripe. 
Even when there is agreement about the basic structure of political theo-
ry, disagreement persists concerning the best social structures for attain-
ing agreed upon goals. Psychologists and philosophers have divergent 
views on the nature of persons. And there is tremendous variation in 
moral beliefs. The more the questions involved are centrally human the 
more there is rational disagreement. It does not follow from the mere 
PERILS OF PLURALISM 315 
fact of disagreement, of course, that there is no fact of the matter in these 
domains of human knowledge. There mayor may not be; there are 
other, realist explanations of rational disagreement, perhaps attributing 
disagreement to the ignorance of one of the parties involved. There are 
more or less agreed upon ways of achieving rational consensus among 
scientists; but just because there is not an agreed upon strategy for 
achieving consensus in more fundamentally human questions, say of 
morality or God, it does not follow that some people aren't justified in 
holding their respective beliefs. Rational people rationally disagree; 
that's just a fact we have to live with. It doesn't follow, however, that 
some people aren't rationally justified. 
By following a rational decision procedure, like Bayes' theorem, we 
may be able to determine which, of a competing set of hypotheses, is 
more likely given our current evidential state; which proposition is right-
ly adjudged more likely than its competitors will be a fortiori the more 
reasonable proposition for us to believe (on the assumption that we have 
paid due homage to defeaters). What should our stance be towards 
beliefs thus justified? Should we think our Bayesian justified beliefs are 
merely how things seem to us but not the way things really are? I think 
not. When we make judgments about which propositions are more likely 
than others, we are really inquiring into which beliefs are more likely to 
be true. There is a link between belief and truth: beliefs aim at the truth. 
Our beliefs are often our best assessment of the way things are. We 
believe because it seems to us that our beliefs are true, or likely to be true, 
or more likely to be true than their competitors. The telos of belief is 
truth. Bayesian rationality is our attempt, based on our total evidence, of 
gaining access to the truth. We should hold such justified beliefs to be 
true. What other stance should one hold towards one's beliefs? That 
they are false? If we believe something, we believe it to be true. 
IV 
We have seen that religious diversity can be taken in at least three 
ways - weak, moderate and strong. In this section I shall argue that, 
although SRD would require a shift in initial commitments for those 
who accept H3 or H4, such people are not typically in a position to be 
rationally justified in accepting SRD; indeed, hardly anyone is in a posi-
tion to accept SRD. 
SRD requires that one make judgments not only about the moral 
practices of practitioners of various religious traditions but also of their 
sincerity and character. One must adjudge that persons, who hold reli-
gious beliefs that are widely divergent from one's own, have undergone 
significant moral transformations. It is not sufficient to judge that such 
persons' outward actions are just or righteous for a wicked person can 
appear just or righteous. To make the judgment of significant moral 
transformation one must also believe that behind good actions lies a vir-
tuous character or noble motives. One can't tell simply by looking if 
another person is virtuous. One might look at a person whom a particu-
lar religious group admires as a moral saint and judge that such a per-
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son's motives were ignoble. For example, if one holds the perversity 
explanation and learns of the astounding moral practices of a practition-
er of another religion (say of stylactites or of extreme self-abnegation), 
one might judge that such persons were simply trying to impress their 
followers or future generations, or incur the gods' favor in order to gain 
eternal bliss; supposing further that they believed that justification is by 
faith and not by works, they may judge that such actions are manifesta-
tions of crass self-interest and demean them rather than value them. 
Consider how one would judge transformational success if one held 
Hick's view, HI. To know or reasonably judge that people are being 
transformed demands that we be able to peak behind the curtain. We 
need to know if someone is really being transformed. Since some reli-
gions place transformation (at least partly) in the next life, we can't know 
ante mortem if such religions are equally successful at transformation. 
Other religions may make people more moral; but whether or not they 
are successful at spiritual transformation is beyond our ken. Even judg-
ments of moral transformation require a peek behind the veil of actions 
into human motivation; this sort of access is denied by Kantians. We can-
not see if people are motivated by respect for the moral law; if not, we 
cannot judge if their respective actions are of genuine moral worth or not. 
Hick's Kantian agnosticism precludes access to any of the relevant sorts 
of information. We can neither know nor reasonably judge if anyone is 
successful at moral or spiritual transformation. The point again-one 
cannot judge transformational effectiveness simply by seeing. 
Appearances are not sufficient. We lack access both to the post-mortem 
goals of transformation and to the fundamental principle of a person's 
action. We are simply not in an epistemic position to make judgments 
about the equal success of differing religious beliefs at moral and spiritu-
al transformation. According to Hick's views, it seems that people 
should be agnostic about the transformational success of the various reli-
gious traditions and, hence, cannot rationally accept MRD or SRD. 
Suppose, however, that I am a practitioner of a particular religion. I 
have been taught my beliefs by my parents and other adults that I 
respect from childhood onwards. I have participated in liturgy that 
reinforces my views on the transformative powers of reality and feel 
cleansed, made whole and at peace with reality. I see significant spiritu-
al transformation in the lives of those who are members of my commu-
nity. I read literature and holy writ that attest to and confirm my view 
of reality. I develop my beliefs about both the goal and the process of 
transformation and these beliefs are arguably justified for me. Now sup-
pose that I am in a position where I must judge whether or not other 
religious traditions are equally transformationally effective. Surely I will 
not be forced, by dint of experience, to judge that people whose practices 
and goals are widely divergent from mine are just as successful at 
putting them in touch with Ultimate Reality and attaining transforma-
tion. I will almost certainly question their beliefs and practices, find 
them strange, perhaps bizarre, and most likely believe them to be mis-
taken. My antecedent commitments prevent me from judging that my 
belief competitors are just as transformationally successful as my beliefs. 
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In this case of theory-laden observation, believing is seeing. 
I argued in the previous section that if almost anyone were to accept 
SRD as true, they may be required to hold HI or ffi, the Kantian or the 
Cultural Filters Explanations of religious diversity. The argument of this 
section shows that few people who accept H3 or H4 however, would be 
obliged to accept SRD as true; hence few people who accept H3 or H4 
will be rationally obliged to revise their beliefs accordingly. 
Furthermore, if Hick's Kantian views are correct, no human being is in a 
position to justifiably believe that any religion is transformationally suc-
cessful; therefore, no human being is obliged to accept SRD; hence, no 
human being is under a rational obligation to affirm HI or H2 on the 
basis of SRD. 
v 
Although I have defended the rationality of holding a realist account 
of one's religious beliefs, I have neither disproved Hick's view nor 
demonstrated the rational preferability of one religion over any other. 
All I have claimed is that if one has warranted realistic views about God 
antecedently to becoming aware of the weak or moderate claims of reli-
gious diversity, then one is reasonable in maintaining one's realistic 
views about God and to reject Hick's Kantian Explanation. Whatever 
warranted beliefs about God one has antecedently, be they Christian, 
Jew, Muslim, Buddhist, Hindu, or Taoist, will remain warranted in the 
face of the claims of religious diversity. And believers in each of these 
traditions will be warranted in affirming that their beliefs are true of 
God an sich. In spite of all that, Hick's Kantian Explanation might 
nonetheless still be true. 
I would like to raise one final, pragmatic, problem with Hick's view: 
If Hick's Kantian Explanation were propounded and accepted, the trans-
formational power of their religious tradition would be undermined for 
most ordinary believers. This is, I maintain, a curious pragmatic 
defeater of Hick's views. His views are appealing in part because of 
their transformational generosity - a wide variety of traditions is 
endorsed as equally likely at securing for its adherents transformation. 
The key question for religious beliefs is their ability to transform one 
from self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness. Indeed he applies this 
pragmatic test to the grading of religions.22 If it can be argued that one's 
transformational prospects are diminished if one accepts his views, then 
a significant pragmatic advantage of the Kantian Explanation is in peril. 
Let me proceed by way of example. My children rise up very early 
on Easter morning eager to scurry about the house to discover the many 
treasures left by the Easter bunny. Baskets filled to the brim, they 
plunge in and consume as much of the gratuitous plunder as their indul-
gent parents allow. It is for them a source of anticipation, excitement 
and delight; one that pries their sleepy eyes open and their groggy bod-
ies out of bed and moves them to spring into action. In the not too dis-
tant future, however, one of their school mates will gleefully inform 
them that it's all a lie. After that, the candy might motivate early rising 
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for a while but they will quickly realize that the candy will be there 
whether they get up early or not. The anticipation and excitement will 
fade, the delight diminish. They will quickly grow out of that belief and 
the motivating power that it once had on them. And their parents will 
no longer give them their candy. 
After they have munched on their candy, we put on our Sunday best 
and rush off to Church to celebrate the resurrection of Jesus. They will 
hear that God loves them so much that he sent his only Son to die for 
them on the cross, and that he has obtained victory over sin, death and 
the devil, and that he has sent the Holy Spirit into their lives to secure 
the transactions that were settled on the cross. The view of human 
nature espoused by them and by Hick is that human beings are unduly 
devoted to the self, perhaps even in bondage to the self. And they 
believe that there is a God who loves justice and wishes them to be just. 
Their transformation from self-centeredness to God-centeredness will 
require, so they will come to believe, mighty acts on the part of God. 
Now suppose that they learn that ultimate reality cannot be discov-
ered and that they don't know whether God is really a person or not, or 
loving and just, or even good or evil. Perhaps he/it/whatever doesn't 
care about their transformation from self-centeredness into Reality-cen-
teredness (perhaps it is a category mistake to apply the property of car-
ing to this being). Whether or not he/it/nothing is actually concerned 
about human transformation is an enigma. Is Reality concerned for 
human welfare or transformation at all? Your guess is as good as mine. 
We aren't allowed a peek behind that veil either. 
I have little doubt that my son, if thus apprised, will not be of such 
iron will to continue rising up early for worship. I suspect that he will no 
longer avail himself of prayer. He will not develop an attitude of thanks-
giving towards the gifts of life. In short he will cut himself off from the 
means of grace of his religious tradition. The problem cuts even deeper. 
If he is not persuaded that reality is ultimately just and loving, he may 
lose incentive to pursue love and justice himself. Indeed, if he does not 
perceive reality as just, he may reasonably affirm that he needs to protect 
his own interests at all costs. That is, he may reasonably corne to believe 
that Thrasymachus is right in claiming that justice is the interest of the 
other, but is an obstacle to one's own happiness. And why not? If there 
is no final reckoning, why not grab for all the gusto now? 
Human beings, so it seems to me, are so constructed that they need 
hope that their moral and spiritual efforts are not in vain. To have that 
hope we must believe that reality is such that it enables or even empow-
ers us to move from self-centeredness to reality-centeredness. To believe 
that ultimate reality may be, for all we know, indifferent or hostile to 
human purposes, is demoralizing - one's best moral and spiritual 
efforts might in the end corne to nothing. If so, it is likely that one will 
falter on the steps toward transformation. Human beings must believe 
that there is a reality that undergirds their beliefs and actions which 
makes human transformation possible. 
The Kantian Explanation takes away that reality and offers instead 
appearance all the while holding that ultimate reality is a mystery. 
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However human beings cannot center their lives around the something-
we-know-not-what. Agnosticism about the ultimate structures of moral 
and spiritual reality defeats the hope necessary for moral and spiritual 
growth. The problem is that our so-called experience of God, according 
to this view, allows us no access to reality. The more our experiences of 
God are perceived as mere appearance, essentially a product of the 
human limits to understanding, more phantom than person or fact, the 
less they are perceived as revealing the nature of things and the less like-
ly they are to achieve their transformational purpose. Interpretive 
schemes concerning human welfare and meaning work best if they are 
believed to be true. Only thus conceived are they likely to free us from 
ourselves and draw us into a community of love, justice and freedom. 
Even if my son were to embrace a Kantian understanding of religious 
belief, his moral and spiritual demise is not inevitable. He may retain 
Christian morality in the absence of classical Christian metaphysics. 
Indeed, Professor Hick is an admirable model in this regard. But my 
son's children and his children's children are even less likely to retain 
the beliefs which are psychologically necessary for the motivation of 
moral and spiritual transformation. The long term demoralizing effects 
of Kantian agnosticism seem abundantly clear. 
It may be, in spite of these pragmatic considerations, that the Kantian 
Explanation is true and that we simply have no idea if God is concerned 
about and structures reality for the improvement of human welfare. But 
if my argument is correct, when it comes to at least the weak and moder-
ate Religious Diversity Claims, neither has any explanatory advantage 
over any of the realist explanations of religious belief. Even if all things 
were equal among the competing hypotheses, pragmatic considerations 
would tell against Hick's Kantian Explanation. 
I said at the beginning of the section that in spite of my arguments, 
Hick's Kantian Explanation of religious diversity might nonetheless be 
true. I have argued in this section, however, that if accepted, Hick's 
views would undermine the hope necessary for the transformation from 
self-centeredness to Reality-centeredness. Even if Hick's Kantian under-
standing of Reality is right, he should just keep it to himselP 
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